yonluandClaude Opus 5
e51cb13662
Two guardrails for the 2026-08-17 incident, and one is not about CI. index-artifact.yml's `push` trigger was commented out that day with a note to restore it once the rebuild completed. Restoring it is the bug. A refresh is individually cheap, which is what made the trigger look free; what it actually did was put an unattended job that mutates the only copy of a ~205 GB catalog on the same trigger as an ordinary code change, on a runner with capacity 1. The rule the file now states is the general one -- a job that mutates state which cannot be rebuilt in ten minutes is triggered deliberately -- so the next such job has somewhere to look. The cron and workflow_dispatch lose nothing: indexbuild resumes from its checkpoint either way. Note what no branching or PR gate would have caught here. That change was green on its branch, green on the merge and green on main; the fault existed only against the persistent /cache database, which no fixture reproduces. Code is gated by CI, irreplaceable state by refusing to touch it and by docs/index-cache.md's restore. The other half is the mismatch that started this: two harnesses reading two files. AGENTS.md is a symlink to CLAUDE.md and skill-check asserts the symlink rather than comparing contents, because a copy would satisfy every other check in this repo while silently drifting -- which is the failure being prevented. The same check now scans CLAUDE.md for make targets, which it never did: 27 targets named in the file agents trust most, none of them verified. Coverage goes 19 -> 46. Scanning prose meant the line-start rule needed a fence. "Two green branches do not / make a green merge" wrapped onto a line beginning `make a` and duly failed on a target called `a`. Inside a fence it is code; outside one it is a sentence that broke there, and a check that fails on reflow gets disabled rather than fixed. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01AfVYUVExXsx1nSWrXN8mAh